# 1AC

#### Developmental epistemologies shape the way micro relations of power shape the beliefs of the population to justify the State actions vis-à-vis the Body. Epistemologies that don’t justify these power relations are shunned and excluded by the normalized state body. Means the prevailing paradigm perpetuates itself by repressing other forms of knowledge.

DuBois 91 (Marc, “The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1991, [CL])

Foucault's definition of power is one of his most controversial concepts, and perhaps his most difficult to grasp as well. There is a clash between his notion and accepted notions of power, the latter having in common a certain sensibility: power that can be seen and felt, examined and seized. In contrast, Foucauldian power appears somewhat esoteric. In spite of greatly different theoretical approaches, power has always been presented as a negative or repressive force. Foucault's analyses of various historical phenomena (e.g., psychiatric treatment or penal technology) led him to believe that "the mechanisms that were brought into operation in these power formations were some~ thing quite other, or in any case something much more, than repression." The essence of Foucault's challenge, then, is to remove the blind spots created by a unidimensional notion of power-a task sorely called for in the social sciences. Redefining Power As Foucault understands it, power-repression in Western society is a sort of anachronism. vestiges of a form of power that used to characterize the societies of the West but, over the past two hundred years or so, has gradually ceded to more evolved mechanisms of power. Foucault does not deny the existence of negative or repressive relations of power, but he deemphasizes them, saying that our obsession with power's negativity conceals the real workings of power. This veil allows other, positive relations of power to function in complete autonomy, beyond suspicion. In its negative or repressive form, power is understood as a force that limits, controls, forbids, masks, withdraws, punishes, excludes, and subjugates. Foucault maintains that power is primarily positive, rather than negative, productive rather than restrictive, exercised rather than possessed, omnipresent rather than localized. He further states that power consists of a set of relations rather than as a commodity and operates from the bottom to the top rather than vice versa. The hallmark of Foucault's conceptualization of power is the assertion that power is a positive or productive force, with the other afore- mentioned characteristics more or less following from and supporting this conclusion. The aim of power is to produce "docile bodies" and "normalized subjects." Why is it that people send their children to school? ls it to abide by the rules of the state that impose the schooling of children upon the public? Or is it not because of a set of norms and truths that have been produced, such as "Teachers are better able than parents to educate children" and "It is a parent's moral duty to send his/ her child to school"? Through detailed historical analyses, Foucault demonstrates that power works much differently than is commonly thought. Relations of power do not determine other kinds of relations (economic, sexual, or family relationships) but are "immanent" in these microrelations. At a particular historical juncture some of these microrelations of power fit together or complement one another, a process that builds "strategies" of power-the weave of power relations that is the condition for macro- relations of power and more "general" or "global" forms of domination. The state, or ruling class, then, results from the configurations and consequences of the microrelations of power. In return, these superstructures of domination determine the environment of the microrelations and, hence, modify or influence them to a certain degree. Political and economic utility act as mechanisms by which certain microrelations of power are "colonized," "invested," "involuted," and "displaced.Âs°3 In this way certain relationships become significant in realms far beyond their original content. For example, relations between anthropologists and Third World ethnic groups gained new meaning and greater political import with the advent of the developmentist epoch because they became of use to donor country, host country, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) apparatuses. One of the most obvious "beneficiaries" of a Foucauldian concept of power would be the state, which can no longer be characterized as the central locus of power and fount of evil in society. Consequently. the state is an inappropriate target of "revolutionary" movements, insofar as it is an effect of and boundary to power relations, not their source. No matter how powerful the state might seem, it is "far from being able to occupy the whole field of power relations [and] can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations." With statements such as these, Foucault inverts the tenets of many emancipatory strategies. For instance, rather than considering the power relations within the family to be "a simple reflection or extension of' the power of the State," Foucault avers that "for the State to function in the way that it does, there must be, between male and female or adult and child, quite specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy.'Â°5 Foucault might be an anathema to the revolution, but he is the patron saint of local resistance. Foucault supports his argument with the example of madness."˜ He shows that the "techniques and procedures" of the exclusion of the mad, rather than that exclusion itself, were of benefit to the bourgeoisie. The same reasoning is relevant to deductions pertaining to the status of development Given the dominant position of the First World vis-a-vis the Third World, given that the developed/underdeveloped dichotomy creates an opening for legitimized intervention, and given that many of the grand schemes for national development that have passed through this aperture at the recommendation of First World experts (e.g., "cash crops" or "white elephant" industrialization projects) have often benefited First World nations while weakening Third World economies and have led to enormous debt burdens, one could, in a top-down analysis, deduce that these development programs were foisted on the Third World with the expressed intent of fortifying First World hegemony. So it is relatively facile to demonstrate that much of development activity is neocolonialist conspiracy. What is more difficult to address are the genealogical questions-to discover why certain policies and theories proliferated and how such diverse practices as building dams, providing educational grants, and introducing high yield grains were colonized by macrostrategies of power. The Union of Power and Knowledge Foucault pursues his idea that power produces (among other things) knowledge, and actually bonds the two concepts together in a single entity: "power-knowledge." This destroys the typical understanding of the relationship between the two in which either (1) knowledge provides a tool or weapon for those in power or (2) a new form of knowledge propels into power new groups or institutions capable of exploiting it. The power-knowledge dyad is welded together by causality in both directions: power and knowledge "directly imply" one another. First, the exercising of power opens new relations of power and creates new objects of understanding or rational inquiry. Second, knowledge immediately "presupposes and constitutes" power relations. Turning to the Third World, it is frightening to consider the prominent role played by knowledge of the beneficiaries in development projects, as shown below. The acquisition of knowledge does not merely justify an intrusion of power, it is an intrusion of power. Parallel to the necessary relationship between power and knowledge there exists a complex reciprocity between power and truth. In producing knowledge, power produces truth. For Foucault, truth refers not to some superficial statement of the way things are, such as three plus two equals five or "apples are fruit," but denotes an abstract "system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements." One example of this sort of truth is the scientific method, which is of paramount importance in contemporary Western society. At the discursive level, this "episteme" distinguishes not truths from falsehoods but 'What may from what may not be characterized as scientific." The episteme, in turn, is connected to the power relations that define and maintain it and to the grid of power that it gives rise to and legitimizes, forming a "regime" of truth. Knowledge, then, arrives in consciousness following a filtering: not only must particular statements submit to the regime of truth, but only they, from a multiplicity of possible statements, are constructed by it. The institutions and community of social scientists are a major culprit in the dissemination of these truth discourses. When these discourses conform with the regime of truth-when the latter validates or approves the former-then certain discourses or bodies of knowledge are admitted into the category of "true knowledge." In this process, a "whole set of knowledges" is rendered suspect, discredited, excluded, and "disqualified" while another, in the case of development, becomes the basis for policy formation. Hence, "le savoir des gens"-local, popular knowledge-has been assigned to categories in the hierarchization of knowledge "beneath the required level of cognition or scient.ificity.'9 One can see that truth, just as knowledge, supports and constitutes power relations, such as those between the development expert and peasant fanner in rural Mali, allowing the discourse of the former to take precedence over the discourse of the latter, even in the realm of the affairs of the latter. Herein lies one of development's most serious flaws. This devaluation of local knowledge dis- associates specific experience (of the problem) from action (the solution), dooming many well-intended development efforts to failure.

#### Recognition of knowledge-power relations is key to loosening the power exercised by the Sovereign at the level of life. War and violence are inevitable in a world of needing to perpetuate these power relations

James **Bernauer,** philosophy professor, Boston College, 19**90,**MICHAEL FOUCAULT'S FORCE OF FLIGHT: TOWARD AN ETHICS OF THOUGHT, pp. 141-142, JT

**This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications** contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustice of capitalism,**a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced a politics that places man's** **"existence as a living being in question."' The very period that**proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy,  that **engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith—this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. What comparison is possible between a sovereign’s authority to take a life and a power that**, in the interest of protecting a society’s quality of life, **can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction. Such a policy** is neither aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill; it **is but the other side of a power that is “situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee an individual's continued existence."" The solace** that Might have been expected **from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of** the victims of a tyrant's vengeance **has been stolen from us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks.  That noose is loosened by breaking with the type of thinking that has led to its fashioning, and by a mode of politic action that dissents from those practices of normalization that have made us all potential victims. A prerequisite for this break is the recognition that human being and thought inhabit the domain of knowledge-power relations**(savoir-pouvoir), **a realization that is in  opposition to traditional humanism.** In the light of SP and VS, man—that invention of recent date—continued to gain sharper focus. By means of that web of techniques of discipline and methods of knowing that exists in modern society, by those minute steps of training through which the body was made into a fit instrument, and by those stages of examining the mind's growth, the "man of modern humanism was born.' The same humanism that has invested such energy in developing a  science of man has foisted upon us the illusion that power is essentially (repressive) in doing so, it has led us into the dead end of regarding the pursuit and exercise of power as blinding the faculty of thought."**Humanism maintains its position as Foucault's major opponent because it blocks the effort to think differently about the relations between knowledge and power. His weapon against this humanism continues to be a form of thinking that exposes human being to those dissonant series of events that subvert our normal philosophical and historical understanding.**

#### Developmental scholarship influences via educational programs and participation in policy deliberation activities such as debate

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The legitimation process that occurs when development actors create the object they are studying in a way that privileges certain forms of state construction and civil participation is a principle of institutionalized forms of development. The strength of the normativity and rationality of liberal institutionalism has not grown simply as a result of development agents coercing the objects of their projects into accepting definitions of a “right political organization”. Rather, the rearrangement of societies according to the particular worldview of liberal institionalism, as Gaventa has postulated, occurs through the ways that power functions through institutions. By undermining the plurality of social and political organization, Gaventa’s argument regarding the third dimension of power illustrates how development as an institution depoliticizes the societies in which it operates. Liberal institutionalism is the dominant ideational and material organization pattern for societies in our present moment. Development helps reinforce the hegemony of liberal institutionalism through shaping worldviews via educational programs, workshops, contingent funding, and participation on policy committees in developing countries. Speech and language mediate understandings of truth, shaping perspectives and actions of people.28 Though the language that development institutions adopt may take on an objective, rationalized and naturalized tone, this information may also be serviceable to the operation of those institutions. Whether to control the individual or benefit from his or her acceptance of the status quo of which the institution is a part, these objectified, rationalized forms of knowledge can come to colonize the everyday life of individuals, exacerbating depoliticization.

**Economic engagement relies on the developmental epistemology to codify and normalize “Latin America” with positive outcomes to cloak the impacts of the 1AC**

**Escobar 1995** [Arturo, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Geography, UNC-Chapel Hill Adjunct Professor, Department of Communications, UNC-Chapel Hill Fellow, Institute of Arts and Humanities, UNC Fellow, Center for Urban and Regional Research, UNC Facilitator, World Anthropologies Network / Red de Antropologías Mundiales Research Associate, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Bogotá, “Encountering Development THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD” 1995, page

ECONOMICS AS CULTURE Needless to say, **economists do not see their science as a cultural discourse.** In their long and illustrious realist tradition, **their knowledge is taken to be a neutral representation of the world and a truth about it.** Theirs is not, as Patricia Williams writes referring to the law in ways that are equally applicable to economics, “an imposition of an order—the ironclad imposition of a world view” (1991, 28). “At issue,” Williams continues, “is a structure in which a cultural code has been inscribed” (1991, 19; my emphasis). This inscription of the economic onto the cultural took a long time to develop, as the philosopher Charles Taylor explains: **There are certain regularities which attend our economic behavior, and which change only very slowly**. . . . But it took a vast development of civilization before the culture developed in which people do so behave, in which it became a cultural possibility to act like this; and in which the discipline involved in so acting became widespread enough for this behaviour to be generalized. . . . **Economics can aspire to the status of a science, and sometimes appear to approach it, because there has developed a culture in which a certain form of rationality is a (if not the) dominant value.** (Taylor 1985, 103). What is the cultural code that has been inscribed into the structure of economics? What vast development of civilization resulted in the present conception and practice of the economy? The answer to this question is complex and can only be hinted at here. Indeed, the development and consolidation of a dominant view and practice of the economy in European history is one of the most fundamental chapters in the history of modernity. **An** **anthropology of modernity centered on the economy leads us to question the tales of the market, production, and labor which are at the root of what might be called the Western economy. These tales are rarely questioned; they are taken as normal and natural ways of seeing life, “the way things are**.” Yet the notions of economy, market, and production are historical contingencies. Their histories can be traced, their genealogies demarcated, and their mechanisms of truth and power revealed. In short, **the Western economy can be anthropologized and shown to be made up of a peculiar set of discourses and practices**—very peculiar at that in the history of cultures. The Western economy is generally thought of as a production system. From the perspective of the anthropology of modernity, however, **the Western economy must be seen as an institution composed of systems of production, power, and signiﬁcation. The three systems,** which coalesced at the end of the eighteenth century, **are inextricably linked to the development of capitalism and modernity. They should be seen as cultural forms through which human beings are made into producing subjects.** The economy is not only, or even principally, a material entity. **It is** above all a cultural production, **a way of producing human subjects and social orders of a certain kind**. Although at the level of production the history of the Western economy is well known—the rise of the market, changes in the productive forces and the social relations of production, demographic changes, the transformation of everyday material life, and the commodiﬁcation of land, labor, and money—analyses of power and signiﬁcation have been incorporated much less into the cultural history of the Western economy. How does power enter into the history of the economy? Very brieﬂy, **the institutionalization of the market system in the eigtheenth and nineteenth centuries also required a transformation at the level of the individual—the production of what Foucault (1979) has called docile bodies**—**and the regulation of populations in ways consistent with the movements of capital**. People did not go into the factories gladly and of their own accord; **an entire regime of discipline and normalization was necessary**. Besides the expulsion of peasants and serfs from the land and the creation of a proletarian class, **the modern economy necessitated a profound restructuring of bodies, individuals, and social forms. This restructuring of the individual and society was achieved through manifold forms of discipline,** on the one hand, **and through the set of interventions that made up the domain of the social**, to which I have alluded, on the other. **The result of this process—Homo oeconomicus—was a normalized subject** **that produces under certain physical and cultural conditions. To accumulate capital, spread education and health, and regulate the movement of people and wealth required no less than the establishment of a disciplinary society** (Foucault 1979).3 At the level of signiﬁcation, the ﬁrst important historical aspect to consider is the invention of the economy as an autonomous domain. It is well known that one of the quintessential aspects of modernity is the separation of social life into functional spheres (the economy, the polity, society, culture, and the like), each with laws of its own. This is, strictly speaking, a modern development. As a separate domain, the economy had to be given expression by a proper science; this science, which emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, was called political economy. In its classical formulation by Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, political economy was structured around the notions of production and labor. **In addition to rationalizing capitalist production, however, political economy succeeded in imposing production and labor as a code of signiﬁcation on social life as a whole**. Simply put, **modern people came to see life in general through the lens of production**. **Many aspects of life became increasingly economized, including human biology, the nonhuman natural world, relations among people, and relations between people and nature.** **The languages of everyday life became entirely pervaded by the discourses of production and the market.** The fact that Marx borrowed the language of political economy he was criticizing, some argue (Reddy 1987; Baudrillard 1975), defeated his ultimate purpose of doing away with it. Yet the achievements of historical materialism cannot be overlooked: the formulation of an anthropology of use value in lieu of the abstraction of exchange value; the displacement of the notion of absolute surplus by that of surplus value and, consequently, the replacement of the notion of progress based on the increase of surplus by that based on the appropriation of surplus value by the bourgeoisie (exploitation); **the emphasis on the social character of knowledge, as opposed to the dominant epistemology, which placed truth on the side of the individual’s mind; the contrast between a unilinear conception of history**, in which the individual is the all-powerful actor, **and a materialist one**, in which social classes appear as the motor of history**; a denunciation of the natural character of the market economy and a conceptualization, instead, of the capitalist mode of production,** in which the market appears as the product of history; **and ﬁnally the crucial insight of commodity fetishism as a paradigmatic feature of capitalist society**. Marx’s philosophy, however, faced limits at the level of the code.4 **The hegemony of the code of signiﬁcation of political economy is the underside of the hegemony of the market as a social model and a model of thought**. **Market culture elicits commitments not only from economists but also from all those living with prices and commodities. “Economic” men and women are positioned in civil societes in ways that are inevitably mediated**, **at the symbolic level, by the constructs of markets, production, and commodities**. **People and nature are separated into parts** (individuals and resources), **to be recombined into market commodities and objects of exchange and knowledge.** Hence the call by critical analysts of market culture to remove political economy from the centrality that it has been accorded in the history of modernity and to supersede the market as a generalized frame of reference by developing a wider frame of reference to which the market itself might be referred (Polanyi 1957b, 270; Procacci 1991, 151; Reddy 1987).5 I suggest that this wider frame of reference should be the anthropology of modernity. **Anthropologists have been complicit with the rationalization of modern economics, to the extent that they have contributed to naturalizing the constructs of economy, politics, religion, kinship, and the like as the fundamental building blocks of all societies. The existence of these domains as presocial and universal must be rejected.** **Instead, “we must ask what symbolic and social processes make these domains appear self-evident**, and perhaps **even ‘natural,**’ **ﬁelds of activity in any society”** (Yanagisako and Collier 1989, 41). The analysis of economics as culture must thus start by subjecting to scrutiny the apparent organization of societies into seemingly natural domains. **It must reverse the “spontaneous impulse to look in every society for ‘economic’ institutions and relations separate from other social relations**, **comparable to those of Western capitalist society**” (Godelier 1986, 18). **This task of cultural critique must begin with the clear recognition that economics is a discourse that constructs a particular picture of the economy**. To use Stephen Gudeman’s metaphor (1986; Gudeman and Rivera 1990), **what we usually recognize as economics is only one “conversation” among many regarding the economy; this conversation became dominant throughout the centuries,** thanks to the historical processes already sketched. Gudeman’s unveiling of the use in anthropology of allegedly universal economic models is instructive: **Those who construct universal models . . . propose that within ethnographic data there exists an objectively given reality which may be captured and explained by an observer’s formal model**. They utilize a “reconstructive” methodology by which observed economic practices and beliefs are ﬁrst restated in the formal language and then deduced or assessed with respect to core criteria such as utility, labor or exploitation. Although the particular **theories used in economic anthropology** are quite diverse, they **share the assumption that one or another universal model exists and can be used to explain a given ﬁeld data**. According to this perspective, a local model usually is a rationalization, mystiﬁcation or ideology; at most, it only represents the underlying reality to which the observer has privileged access. (1986, 28) **Any model,** however, whether local or universal, **is a construction of the world and not an indisputable**, **objective truth about it.** This is the basic insight guiding the analysis of economics as culture. The coming into dominance of modern economics meant that many other existing conversations or models were appropriated, suppressed, or overlooked. **At the margins of the capitalist world economy**, Gudeman and Rivera insist, **there existed and continue to exist other models of the economy, other conversations, no less scientiﬁc because they are not couched in equations or produced by Nobel laureates**. In the Latin American countryside, for instance, these models are still alive, the result of overlapping conversations that have been carried out for a long time. I will come back to the notion of local models in the last section of the chapter. **There is, then, an orientalism in economics that has to be unveiled**—that is, **a hegemonic effect achieved through representations that enshrine one view of the economy while suppressing others.** The critique of economics as culture, ﬁnally, must be distinguished from the better-known analysis of economics as “rhetoric” advocated by McCloskey (1985). McCloskey’s work is intended to show the literary character of economic science and the price economics has paid for its blind adherence to the scientistic attitude of modernism. This author shows how literary devices systematically and inevitably pervade the science of economics. His aim is to improve economics by bringing it into the realm of rhetoric. The aim of this chapter is quite different. Although some rhetorical analysis is used, particularly in the reading of the economic development theories of the 1950s and 1960s, **the analysis of economics as culture goes well beyond the formal aspect of the rethoric of economics**. **How did particular constructions of the economy come to exist? How do they operate as cultural forces? What practices do these constructions create, and what are the resulting cultural orders? What are the consequences of seeing life in terms of such constructions?**

**Micro relations of power is the noose of the State. Micro opposition to the venerated systems of development are key to resisting our impacts. Means if we challenge the epistemology of debate then we weaken the authority it has over the beliefs of populations.**

**DuBois 91**

(Marc, “The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1991, [CL])

In recent years, **a full-blown "crisis" situation has been ushered into development studies** by a spate of literature and conferences with such promising titles as "Rethinking Development," "Alternative Develop- ment," and my favorite, "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies." (Who is being threatened? Should hungry Sudanese children send in their contributions to the agenda?) **Development seems to have become the subject of a social scientific advertising campaign: the world has been offered "new,**" "another," **and "alternative" develop- ments featuring much-heralded** "new trends," "new strategies," and **"new directions." Most of these strategies,** which fall into the overex- tended category of "alternative development," **have resulted not in a rejection of the basic development paradigm but in merely broadening it beyond the parameters of pure economics. A minority** within this broad alternative movement, however, **has gone further than the rest-defying the economistic essentialism of development thinking and**, perhaps most importantly, **challenging the preeminence of the development expert**. The core of arguments in this vein is that the theoretical models underlying development efforts stray dramatically far from being as value-free as they are presented. **Critical of a development based upon Western experience, this sort of alternative program emphasizes self-reliance, local participation**, endogenous patterns of development, **and satisfying basic needs**. These features out- line an interesting approach to development, but **their most important contribution lies** elsewhere-**in the establishment of opposition to the venerated external aid/ technical transfer approach to problems of underdevelopment**. In other words, this alternative program gives birth to a competing paradigm of policy formulation, **which in tum weakens the authority of the prevailing paradigm.** Unfortunately, there is very little force behind this competing notion so that the apparent "crisis" notwithstanding, development is doing just fine, even flourishing-not the process of development of Third World societies, of course, but the business of its promotion. **The effectiveness of radical criticism is diminished because even such alternative frameworks of policy formulation fail to penetrate deep enough to confront the most fundamental assumptions embodied in the dominant development paradigm**. To put it more bluntly, **strategies have been changed, but the foundations of contemporary development ideology are being reinforced. Above the polemics and disagreements over policy**, which appear to distinguish the sundry schools of thought in development studies, **there exists a profound unity. The locus of this unity is to be found not in the perception of the causes of underdevelopment** or the approaches to solving problems therein, **but in the definition and identification of these problems of underdevelopment in the first place. Underdevelopment is defined as a lack**-a lack **that stands out in relief against the backdrop of a "complete" Western society. The existence of "underdeveloped"** (or "developing" or "undeveloped" or "less devel- oped") **and "developed" as categories into which human societies are classified is the sine qua non of the development paradigm.** The manifold critiques of development leave intact the illusion that development comprises a natural category. Although a myriad of strategies for devel- opment has appeared and then fallen from grace, development itself still retains its original moral luster. **It is this self-evident naturalness and law-like necessity of development that constitute the base of the development paradigm. Development is therein transformed** (reval- ued) **into something much more than just a desideratum:** as Skolimowslti laments, "**To be primitive is to be backward, almost half human; to join the West in its quest for progress is an imperative**, an advancement, **an almost necessary condition of being human**." Toward Initiating Crisis **Criticism of development has arrived at a dead end: the term "development” is riddled with elemental value implications, yet no satisfactory replacement exists. The situation warrants a genealogical investigation** (Why was one form of civilization-modern, Western-placed upon a pedestal, thrust aloft as a model to which other civilizations and soci- eties must aspire and in contrast to which they are judged?), **but this** paper **veers toward a complementary objective: the further undermining of the development paradigm** (not simply the more superficial technical paradigms of development but their value-rich foundation). Insofar as they are fundamental (to my society) there is a measure of immunity shielding the underlying values of development from direct confrontation. **It is** therefore **more efficacious to attack development from within.** In other words, **a certain skepticism must be injected into the elemental layers of development discourse in an effort to weaken the pervasive and indisputable appeal of development: people must begin to harbor doubts**. To accomplish this debilitation, I propose to alter the accepted con- ceptualization of development by selecting one of the irreducible build- ing blocks of the development paradigm and then redefining it, thereby altering the structure of the development of which it is a part. To this end, **development will be restructured in the light cast by a Foucauldian conceptualization of power**. Two results emerge from following this exercise: (1) **Our understanding of the process of development is broadened, uncovering "costs" that have heretofore remained ambiguous or unseen**, placing into question the desirability of even those good or suc- cessful development activities (from whomever's standpoint). (2) **The primarily discursive process by which the strategies and practices of development are born and promoted is revealed**, therein **causing the perceived naturalness of the goal of development to pale.** Why Foucault? **He sees power in noneconomic terms-not as a commodity, but as a relation**. More importantly, **he draws a connection between power and knowledge-a link that implicates intellectual fields such as development studies. This perspective is imperative if one is to transcend typical critiques of development, which focus upon a negative conceptualization of power located in the state or related instruments** (e.g., the International Monetary Fund or multinational corporations) **in order to probe power relations at the local level**. The paper proceeds with an explanation of Foucault’s "analytics" of power, and then to a study of power's ineluctable connection with knowledge (and vice versa). After looking a bit more closely at the work- ings of power-knowledge, **the concept will be introduced into an analysis of development practices and then into the discourses surrounding those practices and the larger process of development.** Finally, the resulting picture-"another" development-will be discussed briefly. Before departing on this path, however, it is necessary to render more explicit one of the limits of this investigation: no new (substitute) paradigm is being delineated. **One must suppress the urge to seek out allusions to a scientific "proof" or logical "claim" that the conceptualiza- tion of development arrived at** in this paper **is somehow more correct or true than the one currently in use.** In any case, **such an impossible proposition is not necessary. This paper aims not to inspire the rejection of one conceptualization of development in favor of a second, but, through the revelation of another interpretation of development, to corrupt the self-evidence of development in its masquerade as natural law.**

#### The analysis of discourse allows for different epistemologies to be discussed and deliberated about, not blindly accepted.

Reade **Davis, ‘3**, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Memorial University, “Development Eco-Logies: Power and Change in Arturo Escobar's Political Ecology,” Studies in Political Economy, p. 163, JT//JEDI

In a later essay, however, **Escobar launched a spirited defense of the political underpinnings of his poststructuralist theory. Defying the accusation that poststructuralism inevitably leads to moral relativism, he has argued that, in fact, it provides "very clear criteria for making judgment and taking action based on the analysis of discourse and power and the overall aim of transforming entrenched political economies of truth.** That these criteria can never be universal and valid once and for all does not disable action." **He has called for the forging of new theories of practice that can account for a plurality of truths without abandoning political and ethical foundations.**

#### WE MUST EVADE THE DEMAND FOR SOLUTIONS. THE IDEA OF RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR OF DEMANDING A PLAN IS CAUSED BY NORMALIZATION DISCOURSE.

Dumm 96[Thomas, professor of political science, 1996, Foucault and the Politics of Freedom]

What is the alternative to this recursive effort to fill the vacuum, that is, **to endorse those conventional moralities that** do little more than **operate to intensify the disparities established by normalization** as it moves into the field of life processes themselves.Indeed, in the face of normalization, he suggests **that we need to think for ourselves, evading the demand for solutions. He does not ask how we might behave responsibly because that question has been superseded by normalizing discourse. “Behavior**” itself should be understood for what **is, a reaction to the creation of a norm**.

#### ATTMEPTING TO ERRADICATE DOMINANCE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE STATE TAKES UP THE ROLE OF THE SOVEREIGN WHICH FURTHERS THE COVER OF DISCIPLINARY POWER.

**FOUCAULT IN ’76** [Michel, badass baldie, “Society Must Be Defended”, pgs. 39-40]

**That is why we now find ourselves in a situation where the only existing and apparently solid recourse we have against the usurpations of disciplinary mechanics and against the rise of a power that is bound up with scientific knowledge is precisely a recourse or a return to a right that is organized around sovereignty, or that is articulated on that old principle. Which means in concrete terms that when we want to make some objection against disciplines and all the knowledge­ effects and power-effects that arc hound up with them, what do we do in concrete terms? What do we do in real life? What do the Syndicat de la magistrature and other institutions like it do? What do we do? We obviously invoke right, the famous old formal, bour­geois right. And it is in reality the right of sovereignty. And I think that at this point we are in a sort of bottleneck, that we cannot go on working like this forever; having recourse to sovereignty against discipline will not enable us to limit the effects of disciplinary power. Sovereignty and discipline, legislation, the right of sovereignty and disciplinary mechanics are in fact the two things that constitute- in an absolute sense- the general mechanisms of power in our society. Truth to tell, if we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power, in our search for a nondisciplinary power, we should not be turning to the old right of sovereignty; we should be looking for a new right that is both anti disciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty.**

**Policy discussions of “Latin America” are saturated in ever-present development discourse, means any topical discussions propagate developmental epistemology**

**Escobar, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Anthropology Professor, 95**

(Arturo, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, p. 5-6, IC)

Until the late 1970s, **the central stake in discussions on Asia, Africa, and¶ Latin America was** the nature of **development**. As we will see, from the¶ economic development theories of the 1950s to the “basic human needs¶ approach” of the 1970s which emphasized not only economic growth per¶ se as in earlier decades but also the distribution of the benefits of growth ¶ the main preoccupation of theorists and politicians was the kinds of development¶ that needed to be pursued to solve the social and economic problems¶ of these parts of the world. Even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist¶ strategies were obliged to couch their critique in terms of the need for development,¶ through concepts such as “another development,” “participatory¶ development,” “socialist development,” and the like. In short, **one could¶ criticize a given approach and propose modifications** or improvements accordingly,¶ **but the fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not¶ be doubted. Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social¶ imaginary.**¶ Indeed, it seemed impossible to conceptualize social reality in other¶ terms. **Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent reality¶ of development: governments designing and implementing ambitious¶ development plans, institutions carrying out development programs in city¶ and countryside alike, experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and¶ producing theories ad nauseam**. The fact that **most people's conditions not¶ only did not improve but deteriorated with the passing of time** did not seem¶ to bother most experts. **Reality**, in sum, **had been colonized by the development¶ discourse, and those who were dissatisfied with this state of affairs had¶ to struggle for bits and pieces of freedom within it, in the hope that in the¶ process a different reality could be constructed**.2¶ More recently, however, the development **of new tools of analysis**, in gestation¶ since the late 1960s but the application of which became widespread¶ only during the 1980s, has **made possible analyses of this type of “colonization¶ of reality” which seek to account for this very fact: how certain representations¶ become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality¶ is imagined and acted upon**. Foucault's work on the dynamics of discourse¶ and power in the representation of social reality, in particular, has been¶ instrumental in unveiling the mechanisms by which **a certain order of discourse¶ produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying¶ and even making others impossible**. Extensions of Foucault's insights¶ to colonial and postcolonial situations by authors such as Edward Said,¶ V. Y. Mudimbe, Chandra Mohanty, and Homi Bhabha, among others, have¶ opened up new ways of thinking about representations of the Third World.¶ Anthropology's self-critique and renewal during the 1980s have also been¶ important in this regard.¶ Thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it possible to maintain the focus on domination as earlier Marxist analyses, for instance,¶ did and at the same time to explore more fruitfully the conditions of possibility¶ and the most pervasive effects of development. **Discourse analysis creates¶ the possibility of “stand[ing] detached from [the development discourse]**,¶ bracketing its familiarity, **in order to analyze the theoretical and¶ practical context with which it has been associated**” (Foucault 1986, 3). **It¶ gives us the possibility of singling out “development” as an encompassing¶ cultural space and at the same time of separating ourselves from it by perceiving¶ it in a totally new form**. This is the task the present book sets out to¶ accomplish.